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Introduction

D

uring the two decades that followed the Diplomatic Conference which
drafted the four 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection oj War Victims1
there was comparatively little activity directed towards the codification or
2
extension of the reach of the law ofwar. The only such activity in the 1950's
was the drafting of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection oj Cultural Property
in the Event ojArmed Conjlict. 3 This Convention was undoubtedly a response to
the rapacious actions of agents of Hitler and Goering in German-occupied
territories during World War II. 4 Among other things, it specifically prohibits
the pillage of objects of arts and the use of cultural objects for purposes exposing
them to the dangers of damage or destruction. The United States has not ratified
this Convention but there are indications that it is tending towards such action
in the foreseeable future.
In 1967 the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities ojStates in the Exploration
and Use oj Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies was opened
for signature.5 Article IV (1) of that Treaty prohibits the placing in orbit around
the Earth of any nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction or their
installation on any celestial body. The second paragraph of that article, in effect,
demilitarizes the moon and other celestial bodies.
The only other activity in this field in the 1960's was the 1968 Convention on
the Non-Afplicability oj Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity. This Convention was approved by the General Assembly of the
United Nations at a time when it was feared that the criminal statute of
limitations of the Federal Republic ofGermany would soon preclude that nation
of continuing its program of prosecutions for war crimes committed by German
nationals during the course of World War II? It is of interest to note that in
that Convention the definition of "crimes against humanity" was extended with
8
the specific additions of apartheid and genocide. Once again, the United States
has not ratified this Convention and it would appear that it has no intention of
so doing.

The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.
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During the decade ofthe 1970's four conventions were drafted which resulted
in major additions to the law of war.
There were:

1. 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition ofthe Emplacement ofNuclear Weapons and
Other Weapons ofMass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and
the Subsoil Thereof (better known as the Seabed Convention);9
2. 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (BiologicaQ and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction {better known as the Baderiological Convention);10
3. 1976 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use
ofEnvironmental Modification Techniques (better known as the ENMOD
Convention); 11 and
4. 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
and Relating to the Protection of Vidims of International Armed Conflicts
(protocol I) {better known as the 1977 Additional Protocol 1).12
And while the decade of the 1980's, and the 1990's to date, have not been
so prolific, the importance of the few decisions reached during those two periods
cannot be overstated. In 1980 a Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use ofCertain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious
or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (with three Protocols) {better known as the
Conventional Weapons Convention)13 was drafted; and in 1993 agreement was
finally reached on a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destrudion. 14 It is with these
latter six Conventions that we will now concern ourselves. It is, perhaps,
appropriate to point out at this time that several of these Conventions were
drafted by the Conference on Disarmament which meets in Geneva on a more
or less permanent basis and under a variety of tides. However, that does not
15
lessen their impact on the law of war. The various 1907 Hague Conventions
which contain much of the basic codified law of war were drafted by a so-called
"Peace Conference"; and many law-of-war conventions, such as the 1925
Geneva Protocol,16 the 1936 London Submarine Protocol,17 etc. were drafted by
disarmament conferences-but this did not lessen their impact on the law of
war.
Seabed Treaty

Article I of the 1971 Seabed Treaty Provides that States Parties thereto
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undertake not to emplant or emplace on the seabed and the ocean floor and in
the subsoil (thereof beyond the outer limit of a seabed zone) ... any nuclear
.
18
weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction ....

This prohibition does not apply to the territorial waters of coastal States, but
under Article II it does apply to the "seabed zone" which includes all places
beyond the twelve-mile limit as measured in accordance with the provisions of
the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. 19 In effect, the
Seabed Treaty prohibits the laying of nuclear mines or other nuclear weapons
under the waters of the high seas.
Article III of this Convention contains the verification provisions. Every State
Party to the Treaty has "the right to verify through observation" the activities
on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof of every other State
Party "provided that observation does not interfere with such activities"; and a
State Party may, ifit deems it necessary, refer the matter to the Security Council
of the United Nations. Inasmuch as such activities will necessarily be taking
place on the seabed and ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the
territorial waters of any coastal State, this means that it will be taking place under
the waters of the high seas. The "right" thus granted appears to be more or less
meaningless as it would exist even without the treaty grant. In fact, in view of
the provision that the observation may not interfere with a State's activities on
the seabed, it may even be argued that the provision, rather than assisting in
verifying compliance, protects the State engaged in illegal activities from
observation as it may label any such observation as "interference". Similarly,
every State Party to the Treaty would have the right to have recourse to the
Security Council of the United Nations if it had evidence that another State
Party was violating the provisions of the Treaty even without a specific provision
granting that right. It can be seen that in drafting this article the draftsmen were
more concerned with ensuring that it could be said that the Treaty included a
verification provision than with drafting a meaningful provision on the subject.
The United States is a Party to this Treaty. It will be necessary at some point
to reach a decision as to whether it prohibits the use of nuclear warheads on
such weapons as the CAPTOR of the United States Navy, a weapon which lies
on the seabed and discharges a torpedo only when activated by the passage of a
submarine, a torpedo which is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.
Bacteriological Convention

While we usually refer to the 1925 Geneva Protocol as the instrument
prohibiting the use of asphyxiating gases, actually it prohibited the use not only
of asphyxiating gases but also of "bacteriological methods of warfare". In 1972,
being unable at that time to reach agreement on a more comprehensive
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combined chemical-bacteriological weapons convention, a convention was
signed by which the States Parties to it agreed to prohibit the "development,
production and stockpiling" of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons,
and further agreed to destroy all such weapons then in their arsenals. 20 With
"use" already prohibited, this means that the States Parties have, in effect, agreed
that no such weapons could be or would be available in any future war.
Once again, Article VI of this Convention, dealing with verification, leaves
much to be desired. It provides for the lodging of a complaint with the Security
Council of the United Nations with respect to any alleged violation of the
provisions of the Convention and includes an undertaking by any State Party to
the Convention to cooperate in any investigation thereafter initiated by the
Security Council. Unfortunately, such an investigation can, of course, be
prevented by a veto in the Security Council; and a number of States have
heretofore found it expedient to disregard mandates of the Security Council and
undoubtedly will do so in the future when they believe that such action is in
their national interest-which, of course, it will be when they are the actual
violators of the Convention and are being investigated.
The United States is a Party to this Convention. Strange to relate, all of the
"non-law-abiding States", with the exception ofSyria, have found it appropriate
to became Parties to this Convention. To what extent they can be expected to
comply with its provisions is debatable?!
ENMOD Convention

By Article I of the 1976 ENMOD Convention a State Party thereto has
undertaken
not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification
techniques having widespread long-lasting or severe effects as the means of
destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party.

Article II defines environmental modification techniques as "any technique
for changing-through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes-the
dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth." Although Article III of the
Convention specifically provides that it does not apply to environmental
modifications techniques for peaceful purposes, a number of States have
apparently failed to ratify this Convention for fear that, despite that specific
provision, they will be accused of a violation of the Convention and of a hostile
act, if, for example, they seed a cloud in order to cause rain to fall over an arid
area of their territory, when, had that action not been taken, the cloud might
have provided much-needed rain on the territory of a neighboring State.
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Problems with respect to the objectives and application of the Convention
and with respect to charges of violations thereof are covered in Article V which
provides for the establishment of a Consultative Committee of Experts to solve
the former and for resort to the Security Council of the United Nations to pass
on the latter. An Annex to the Convention sets out the functions and rules of
procedure of the Consultative Committee. The provisions with respect to the
Security Council are, with a few unimportant exceptions, identical with those
contained in the 1971 Bacteriological Convention, discussed above.
Because of the technical nature of this Convention, the draftsmen deemed it
appropriate to reach a number of "understandings" which are not a part of the
Convention itse1£22 These understandings include definitions of the terms
"widespread", "long-lasting", and "severe" used in Article I; and an illustrative
list of examples of the phenomena referred to in Article II.
The United States is a Party to this Convention?3
1977 Additional Protocol I

Mter negooatlOns conducted during 1974, 1975, 1976, and 1977, a
Diplomatic Conference convened by the Swiss Government was finally
successful in completing the drafting ofthe 1977 Additional Protocol I, the primary
purpose of which was to provide protection from the hazards of war to the
persons not protected by the 1949 Geneva Conventions: the civilian populations
in the unoccupied territory of the belligerent States?4 Unfortunately, primarily
because of a certain group of provisions of that Protocol, many States, including
France, Great Britain, and the United States, have not ratified it.
The Preamble to this Protocol contains a statement to which the United
States fully subscribes. After referring to the international agreements containing
the rules of the law of war, it states that these rules
must be applied in all circumstances to all persons who are protected by those
instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the nature or origin of the
armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the Parties to the
conflict.
This is a complete rejection of the doctrine of the '~ust war", espoused by
some nations, under which the law of war is binding upon their enemy, always
the aggressor, while it is not binding upon the victim of aggression, always
onesel£
Article 1 of the Protocol is concerned with when it is applicable. Paragraph
4 of that Article states:
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4. The situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include anned conflicts
in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation
and against racist regimes. . . .

Prior to this provision the conflicts therein referred to had been considered
to be internal conflicts, civil wars to which the international law of war did not
apply. This provision, with its corollary provisions in Articles 43 and 44, is one
of the main objections of the United States, and other States, to this Protocol.
2S
Ever since the unratified 1874 Declaration cif Brussels four requirements for
a person to be a legal combatant have been repeated in convention after
convention. He must:
1.
2.
3.
4.

be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
wear a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance;
carry his arms openly;
conduct military operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. 26

Article 43(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I only partially follows the
historical precedent in that it requires the armed forces of a belligerent to have
a responsible commander (Item 1 above) and to enforce the law of war (Item 4
above). Then Article 44(3), after stating that there are occasions when an armed
combatant cannot distinguish himself from the non-combatant civilian
population, permits him to retain his status as a legal combatant with the sole
requirement that he carry his arms openly
1. during each military engagement; and
2. during such time as he is visible to his adversary while engaged in a
military deployment preceding an attack. (This is a very limited
application ofItem 3 above).
There is no requirement that combatants wear "a fixed distinctive emblem
recognizable at a distance"--or any other kind of distinctive marking (Item 2
above). Obviously, these provisions of the Protocol put the civilian population
at risk in order to give additional protection to members of national liberation
movements. And Article 44(4) provides that if a combatant (read that as "a
member of a national liberation movement") fails to comply with the modest
requirements of the provision concerning the carrying of arms openly, while he
will not be entided to the status of a prisoner of war, he will be entided to all
27
the protection to which a prisoner of war is entided. There is no explanation
of the difference between 1. having the status of a prisoner of war; and 2. not
having that status but, nevertheless, having all of the protection to which a
prisoner of war is entided. In their demand for the protection of members of
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national liberation movements the Third W orId States gave these individuals,
even when illegal combatants, more protection than the legal, uniformed
. 28
combatant recelves.
Once again, problems arose when the Conference attempted to draft a
verification provision. It ended with a very lengthy Article 90 entitled
"International Fact-Finding Commission, the Commission being tasked with
the chore ofinvestigating complaints ofgrave breaches or other serious violations
of the fOUI 1949 Geneva Conventions and of the 1977 Protocol I. The main
objection here is that it is applicable only to those States which have filed a
statement accepting the jurisdiction of the commission. 29
There are a number of provisions of this Protocol which are either a
codification of the customary international law of war or are much-needed
additions to that law. For example, Articles 35 and 55 are attempts to protect
30
the natural environment from the effect ofwar. Article 51 prohibits attacks
on the civilian population; prohibits attacks which have as their primary purpose
the spreading of terror among the civilian population; prohibits target-area
bombing; and prohibits reprisal attacks against the civilian population. Article
52 prohibits attacks on civilian objects which are not military objectives, as well
as reprisals against such objects which are not military objectives, as well as
reprisals against such objects. Article 53 prohibits attacks on historic monuments,
works of art, and places ofworship, as well as reprisals against such places. Article
54 provides that "Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited"
and then lists specific sources offood and water supplies indispensable to civilian
life which are not to be attacked, even by way of reprisal.
On a number of occasions officials of the United States Government at the
policy-making level have indicated that this country accepts many of the
provisions of the Protocol as binding law?1 However, neither the Reagan nor
the Bush Administrations sent the Protocol to the Senate for that body's advice
32
and consent to ratification by the President.
Whether the Clinton
Administration will do so remains to be seen-so far it has not done so but there
are rumors that it is engaged in another review of the Protocol in order to
determine whether it should be sent to the Senate for the latter's advice and
consent to ratification and, if so, what understandings or reservations should be
included.
Conventional Weapons Convention

During the early 1970's a conference of government experts convened by
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) drafted a list of
conventional weapons which were believed to require consideration because
they appeared to cause unnecessary suffering or to be indiscriminate in their
effect. There were:
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Small calibre projectiles;
Blast and fragmentation weapons;
Time-delay weapons Qand mines and booby traps);
Incendiary weapons; and
Potential weapons development. 33

In 1977, near the conclusion of the Diplomatic Conference which ultimately
drafted the 1977 Additional Protocol I, that Conference adopted a resolution
recommending that another conference be held to draft "~rohibitions and
restrictions on the use of specific conventional weapons". 4 The General
Assembly of the United Nations thereafter convened such a Conference. It met
in 1979 and 1980 and drafted the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use ofCertain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious
or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, to which three Protocols were attached.
The Convention itself is merely an "umbrella" convention containing
administrative provisions applicable to all three of the substantive Protocols.
Article 1 makes the Convention and the Protocols applicable in "any situation
described in paragraph 4 of Article 1 of Additional Protocol I"; and Article 7(4)
elaborates on that provision by providing how a State Party to this Convention
may become bound by it vis-a-vis a national liberation "authority". Paragraph 4
of Article 1 of the 1977 Additional Protocol is as we have already seen, one of the
major reasons why the United States has not ratified that Protocol. However,
with respect to the 1977 Additional Protocol I a major objection was that it served
as the basis for Article 44(3) of that instrument which removed from members
of national liberation movements the historic requirements for legal combatants
and it was argued that this gave protection to terrorists. That problem does not
arise with respect to this Convention or its Protocols. When the United States
ratified this Convention, it made a reservation with respect to Article 7(4)(b).
(France made reservations to several of these provisions, including Article
7(4) (b»?5
Article 4 of this Convention, dealing with ratifications, is rather unique. It
requires that in ratifying the Convention a State must also ratify at least two of
the three attached Protocols. And, finally, Article 8 of the Convention provides
for the calling of a review conference by the Parties thereto ten years after the
effective date of the Convention if none has been called prior to that date. That
ten-year period has now expired and it is expected that the review conference
will meet in September 1995.
It is in the Protocols themselves that important provisions of the law of war
are contained. Protocol I is entitled Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Non-Detectable Fragments. It prohibits the use of any weapon "the primary effect
of which is to injure by fragments which in the human body escape detection
by X-ray". It was directed primarily against weapons made of such materials as
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glass and plastic. It was completely non-controversial, probably because, as one
of the United States Delegates has said, "no one seems to have had any serious
military interest in such weapon,,?6 A Canadian Delegate has stated that this
Protocol "bans a weapon which does not exist,,?7 It was the fear that States
would only ratify the Convention and its Protocol I that caused the adoption
of the provision in Article 4 of the Convention requiring the ratification of two
or more of the Protocols. Actually, that fear does not appear to have been
justified. As of31 December 1992, thirty-five States had become Parties to the
Conventional Weapons Convention and all but Benin and France had ratified all
three Protocols. Benin approved Protocols I and III and France ratified Protocols
I and 11.38
Protocol II is concerned with Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use of Mines,
Booby Traps and Other Devices. It is to be noted that Article 1 makes it clear that
its subject matter is limited to land mines only. That article specifics that its
coverage includes "mines laid to interdict beaches, waterway crossings or river
crossings" but that it "does not apply to the use of anti-ship mines at sea or in
inland waterways".
Article 2 of this Protocol contains two very important definitions, among
others:
"mine" means any munition placed under, on or near the ground or other surface
area and designed to be detonated or exploded by the presence, proximity or
contact of a person or vehicle; "remotely delivered mine" means any mine
delivered by artillery, rocket, mortar or similar means or dropped fonn an aircraft.

Of course, the foregoing provision with respect to "remotely delivered
mines" would also apply to the weapons of warships.
The second definition of interest is that relating to booby traps. It states:
"Booby-traps" means any device or material which is designed, constructed or
adapted to kill or injure and which functions unexpectedly when a person disturbs
or approaches an apparently harmless object or performs an apparently safe act.

Of particular interest is the fact that there is a list of ten categories of articles
the booby-trapping of which is prohibited. These categories include objects
specially designed for children, including toys, a type of booby trap widely used,
with grim results, in Mghanistan.
Another category worthy of note is
kitchen utensils, or appliances except in military establishments, military locations
or military supply depots.

396

Levie on the Law of War

The unit cook is an important person. He must be warned of the possibility
oflegal booby traps so that he will take care in adding enemy kitchen utensils
to his collection!
Other important provisions concerning mines are those requiring the
recording of information with respect to the location of minefields. Not only is
this subject covered in several articles of Protocol II, but there is a Technical
Annex containing guidelines for such recording.
There are special provisions in Article 8 of Protocol II for the protection of
United Nations forces and missions from minefields, mines, and booby traps.
When one reads of the relief trucks which have been the victims of buried mines
on much-traveled roads both in Somalia and in Bosnia, the need for such
provisions becomes obvious-but that they will be complied with appears to be
questionable.
One final provision which is of major importance is contained in Article 9.
It provides for various procedures, both national and international, to be
followed upon the cessation of hostilities in order to "remove or otherwise
render ineffective, minefields, mines and booby traps placed in position during
the conflict". After World War II there was an "International Agreementfor the
Clearance ofMines in European Waters",39 but there was no equivalent agreement
with respect to land mines. Mter those hostilities had ended the French kept
well over one hundred thousand German prisoners of war engaged in the task
of mine removal on French territory, with many casualties, as a result of which
40
the 1949 Geneva Third Convention specifically prohibits such action. For many
years after the end ofWorld War II there were civilian mine casualties in North
Africa. And even at this late date there are almost daily casualties caused by land
•
•
11.£ h ·
rrunes
In.lUg
arustan. 41
It is clear that land mines have become one of the major problems of the
world as we approach the Twenty-First century. It is also clear that this Protocol
is entirely inadequate for the protection of mankind from a weapon that has
42
assumed the role of the major hazard to the civilian population. There is
pressure for an international agreement for the complete prohibition of the use
ofland mines and at least some strong limitations on their use appears to be just
over the horizon.
Let us now turn to Protocol III-Protocol on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the
Use of Incendiary Weapons. This was undoubtedly the most controversial of the
three Protocols. It contains only two articles, the first dealing with definitions
and the second with the protection of civilians and civilian objects. (It should
be emphasized that the primary objective of both Protocols II and III is
protection of civilians.) Incendiary weapons are defined as
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any weapons or munition which is primarily designed to set fire to objects or to
cause bum injury to persons through the action of flame, heat, or combinations
thereof, produced by chemical reaction of a substance delivered on the target.
The definition goes on to specifically exclude from its coverage weapons
which have incidental incendiary effects and combined effects munitions
(CEMs). Although the word "napalm" was heard frequendy during the
discussions, that word will not be found in the Protocol itsel£
Article 2(1) states that
it is prohibited in all circumstances to make the civilian population as such,
individual civilians, or civilian objects the object of attack by incendiary weapons.
There can be no objection to this provision. Civilians, and civilian objects
not being used for military purposes, should not be the objects of any type of
attack, incendiary or non-incendiary.
Article 2(2) prohibits air-delivered incendiary attacks on military objectives
located within a concentration of civilians. This provision is, perhaps, overly
broad, as many important military objectives, such as national command and
communication centers, are frequendy located within a concentration of
civilians; and many types of major military objectives, even when originally built
away from concentrations of civilians, are soon to be found surrounded by
concentrations of civilians. Decisions in this regard should be based on the
principle of proportionality.43 Of course, if, as a matter of military tactics,
another type of air-delivered weapon can be just as effective in destroying such
a military objective, for example, the so-called "smart-bomb", it should be the
weapon selected.
Article 2(3) prohibits attacks on military objectives within a concentration of
civilians by incendiary weapons, other than those which are air-delivered,
"except when such military objective is clearly separated from the concentration
of civilians and all feasible precautions are taken.,,44 As only a small number of
military installations are "clearly separated" from concentrations of civilians,
once again the doctrine of proportionality should be applied.
Article 2(4) is undoubtedly a throwback to Vietnam and the defoliation
program employed there by the United States. It provides:
It is prohibited to make forests or other kinds ofplant cover the object ofattack
by incendiary weapons except when such natural elements are used to cover,
conceal or camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves
military objectives.
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There does not appear to be anything contained in this Protocol which would
be so restrictive on military operations as to justify the refusal of the United
States to ratify it; and if there is any such provision, surely it could be taken care
of by an understanding or, ifdeemed necessary, by a reservation. 45 Nevertheless,
the President transmitted only the Convention and Protocols I and II to the
Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, accompanied by a statement to
the effect that action on Protocol III was being deferred pending further
.
.
46
exanunatlOn.
Chemical Weapons Convention

It will be recalled that in 1925 the Geneva Protocol was drafted and that it
was subsequendy widely accepted by States. 47 It is important to emphasize that
this Protocol prohibited "use" only. As a result many States ratified it with what
was known as the "First-Use Reservation". What this meant was that most
nations engaged in the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical
and bacteriological weapons in order to be prepared to retaliate in kind should
a future enemy make first use of such weapons.
While, as we have seen, in 1972 it was found possible to draft a convention
prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological
weapons, the problem of chemical weapons long continued unsolved, primarily
because of the difficult question of verification. It was not until September 1992
that a Drqft Convention on the Prohibition ofthe Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction was finally submitted to the
General Assembly of the United Nations. In February 1993 that organization
approved the Convention and submitted it to the States for ratification or
accession. It is far lengthier and more complex than its bacteriological brother.
In fact, it is probably the most complex law-of-war convention ever drafted.
Let us study a few of its highlights.
Article I is the heart of the Convention. By it each State party undertakes
that it will never under any circumstances:
1. Develop, produce, or otherwise acquire or stockpile chemical weapons, or
transfer such weapons to "anyone";
2. Use chemical weapons; or
3. Engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons.

That article contains these further undertakings by each Party:
1. To destroy any chemical weapons that it owns or possesses or that are located
within its jurisdiction;
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2. To destroy any chemical weapons that it has abandoned on the territory of

another State Party; and
3. To destroy any chemical weapons production facilities that it owns or possesses
or that are located within its jurisdiction.
Finally, that Article provides that "Each State Party undertakes not to use riot
control agents as a method ofwarfare"-and therein lies the problem as far as
the United States is concerned. When the United States finally ratified the 1925
Geneva Protocol in 1975 there was an agreement between the President and the
Senate that an Executive Order would be issued covering the subject of riot
control agents. The Executive Order which was issued provides that the United
States renounced the first use of herbicides except for certain limited purposes;
and then lists four situations in which it will use riot control agents in war:
1. In riot conditions in areas under US military control including for the control
of rioting prisoners of war;
2. In situations in which civilians are used to mask or screen attacks;
3. In rescue missions in remotely isolated areas of downed airmen and escaping
prisoners of war; and
4. In rear echelon areas to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists, and
.
..
48
paramilitary orgaruzatJons.
It is to be assumed that in ratifying the Convention the United States will
continue to insist on the legality of the use of riot control agents in those four
situations despite the very adverse reception that such claim encountered during
the drafting process.
Article II contains a large number oflengthy definitions. Ofparticular interest
is the fact that research and development of methods of protection against toxic
chemicals and chemical weapons is not prohibited. Article III is a rather unusual
provision. Within thirty days of ratification or accession a State Party must make
a number of declarations concerning its ownership of chemical weapons, their
location, its program of destruction, etc. Articles IV and V are concerned with
the destruction of chemical weapons and the closing and destruction ofchemical
weapons production facilities, respectively. Article VII establishes an elaborate
permanent organization to oversee and verify compliance with the Convention.
Article IX establishes the methods by which verification by an organ of the
Organization may be obtained. These methods include what is termed
"Challenge Inspections"-an on-site inspection by members of the Technical
Secretariat of the Organization requested by any State Party which believes that
there is non-compliance by another State Party. (There is also a 100-page
"Verification Annex" which fleshes out various parts of the Convention proper).
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Article XII is entitled "Measures to Redress a Situation and to Ensure
Compliance; Including Sanctions".
Apparently, while the United States is not enamored with all of the provisions
of the Convention or of the Verification Annex, and particularly with the
wording of some of them, it will accept the entire document as written with a
reservation with respect to riot control agents mentioned above. What action,
if any, with respect to this Convention will be taken by the "non-law-abiding
States" mentioned above remains to be seen-but it would probably be unwise
to expect them to become Parties to it, or to comply with it if they do become
. 49
Pames.
Conclusion

It may safely be said that while law-of-war activity during the first half of the
Twentieth Century was notable for the numerous 1907 Hague Conventions, the
1925 Geneva Protocol, and the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, the second half of
that century was characterized by a melange of much-needed international
legislation relating to a variety of unrelated aspects of this field. 50 It is perhaps
being overly optimistic to look forward during the balance of this century to
the widespread adoption of a Convention on the Prohibition oj the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use oj Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons oj Mass
Destruction and on Their Destruction. However, such an event is not as unlikely as
it once was. On 3 September 1993 the World Health Organization (WHO)
requested an advisory opinion from the International Court ofJustice on the
following question:
In view of the health and environmental effects, would the use of nuclear
weapons by a States in war or other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations
under intemationallaw including the WHO Constitution?51
Then on 15 December 1994 the General Assembly of the United Nations
adopted Resolution 49/75 entitled "Request for an Advisory Opinion from the
International Court ofJustice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons". The question posed by the General Assembly asks:
Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance pennitted under
intemationallaw?52
Both of those matters are presently pending before the Court. Should the
Court decide the former affirmatively, and the latter negatively, the possibility
of an international convention implementing those decisions and totally
prohibiting not only the threat or use of nuclear weapons, but their very
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existence, would be gready enhanced and the law-of-war activities of the latter
half of the Twentieth Century would truly have a major place in history.
Unfortunately, it can be assumed with more than a reasonable degree ofcertainty
that were such a fortuitous event to occur, a number ofpresent-day, or potential,
possessors of nuclear weapons would fail to become Parties to such a
convention-or would become Parties with the preconceived idea of violating
their agreement and thereafter being in a position to hold the non-nuclear world
hostage.
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